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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Blair Olsen appeals from his withheld judgment, entered after a jury found
him guilty of three counts of misuse of public money.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted former county sheriff Olsen on four counts of misuse
of public money. (R., pp. 10-12.) Counts I through III were for “providing his wife
a cell phone with service paid for by Jefferson County for her personal use” in
2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively, and Count IV was for “receiving the benefit
of a personal lifetime membership to the National Rifle Association (NRA)
purchased by Jefferson County Funds.” (Id.)
Olsen moved to dismiss the indictment on several grounds, including that
“Counts I-III of the Indictment are multiplicitous and violate the Defendant’s
Constitutional Right to be free from double jeopardy.” (R., pp. 45, 79.) The
district court granted the motion in part and dismissed Count IV as barred by the
statute of limitations, but denied the motion in relation to Counts I through III. (R.,
p. 140.)

The district court concluded that three counts for three years was

appropriate, in part because each count related to different annual budgets and
in part because it was more appropriate to bring charges based on the years
than based on each monthly payment. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 50, L. 18 – p. 52, L. 8.)
The matter proceeded to trial, after which the jury found Olsen guilty of the
three remaining counts.

(R., p. 491.)

After trial Olsen moved for acquittal,

asserting the “political question doctrine” prevented the jury from deciding his
1

guilt and asserting that the statute under which Olsen was convicted, I.C. § 185701(10)1, was unconstitutionally vague. (R., pp. 518-33.) The state objected
that the motion was not properly brought under I.C.R. 29(c) and that it lacked
merit.

(R., pp. 552-64.)

The district court agreed that the motion was not

properly brought under I.C.R. 29(c), but that this procedural irregularity did not
require denial of the motion and that the merits were properly before the court.
(6/19/15 Tr., p. 117, L. 10 – p. 119, L. 17.) The district court first held that the
political question doctrine did not apply because Olsen’s motion was based on
the “false premise” that the county commissioners had actually authorized
payment of Olsen’s wife’s private cell phone (as opposed to a backup phone for
Olsen) and also held that the claim failed on the legal merits, because any postfacto determination of public purpose by the county commissioners was not
binding on the jury. (6/19/15 Tr., p. 119, L. 18 – p. 126, L. 9.) The district court
also rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, finding
that it provided adequate notice of what actions constituted the crime of misuse
of public moneys. (6/19/15 Tr., p. 126, L. 10 – p. 138, L. 11.)
After sentencing the district court entered an order withholding judgment,
and Olsen filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., p. 584, 590.)

That statute provides: “No public officer or public employee shall: … Knowingly
use any public moneys, or financial transaction card, financial transaction card
account number or credit account issued to or for the benefit of any
governmental entity to make any purchase, loan, guarantee or advance of
moneys for any personal purpose or for any purpose other than for the use or
benefit of the governmental entity.”
1

2

ISSUES
Olsen states the issues on appeal as:
1.

When the determination of a public purpose for an
expenditure is left to the Jefferson County Board of
Commissioners, did the trial court err in not dismissing the
criminal action because it would require insertion of the
judiciary into a “political question” in violation of the bedrock
principle of constitutional separation of powers?

2.

Was Blair Olsen’s fundamental constitutional right to Due
Process violated because the criminal statute was
unconstitutionally vague, resulting in arbitrary enforcement
and a lack of the required notice of prohibited conduct?

3.

Was the constitutional principle of double jeopardy violated
when the State used a single decision by Blair Olsen to
serve as a basis for three separate felony counts?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Olsen failed to show that the question of his guilt under a criminal
statute was improperly submitted to the jury?

2.

Has Olsen failed to show that the misuse of public money statute is
unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied?

3.

Has Olsen failed to demonstrate that, where he paid for his wife’s cell
phone service with public money for three years, out of three different
county budgets, that convicting and sentencing him for three crimes
exceeded the legislative intent for punishment of misuse of public
moneys?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Olsen Has Failed To Show That The Question Of Whether He Committed The
Crime Of Misuse Of Public Moneys Was Improperly Submitted To The Jury
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Olsen’s motion to dismiss based on the argument

that a criminal trial was not the appropriate forum to decide his guilt. (6/19/15 Tr.,
p. 119, L. 18 – p. 126, L. 9.) The district court first concluded that Olsen’s motion
was “based on a false premise that the Jefferson County Commissioners
approved the defendant’s wife’s use of the cell phone.” (6/19/15 Tr., p. 120, Ls.
6-9.) The “evidence establishes that the county approved of a backup phone”
but “did not and could not have known it was [for] the sheriff’s wife’s use or the
manner of her use until well after the use was discontinued.” (6/19/15 Tr., p. 120,
Ls. 16-24.) It was important to the district court that “the evidence is pretty clear
that until the acts that were charged were completed, [the commissioners] didn’t
know anything about it.” (6/19/15 Tr., p. 122, Ls. 15-20.) Given those facts,
“[t]here’s no authority for a county retroactively authorizing or circumventing state
laws through decisions of their county commissioners.” (6/19/15 Tr., p. 121, Ls.
10-12.)
Olsen argues the district court erred, claiming that the criminal court
lacked jurisdiction under the “political question doctrine.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.
10-23.) Application of the relevant law to the facts shows that Olsen has failed to
show error by the district court.

4

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised

at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”

State v.

Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). The construction and
application of a statute also presents a question of law over which the appellate
court exercises free review. State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d
729, 730 (2006); State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003). “Under the restrained standard of clear error customarily applied to
factual issues, a factual finding will not be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after
reviewing the record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” State v. Bird, 119 Idaho 196, 198, 804 P.2d 925,
927 (Ct. App. 1990).
C.

Whether Olsen Committed The Crime Of Misuse Of Public Funds Was A
Question For The Jury, Not The County Commissioners
The courts of Idaho “are bound to respect the reasonable exercise by the

legislature of powers expressly delegated to it by the constitution of this state,
and in the absence of other constitutional offense cannot interfere with it.” In re
SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995). “The
district court cannot usurp the power of the executive branch or the power of the
legislative branch by unreasonably retaining jurisdiction for itself.”

State v.

Parvin, 137 Idaho 783, 786, 53 P.3d 834, 837 (Ct. App. 2002). “This Court has
consistently recognized that the separation of powers provided by Article II of our

5

constitution prohibits judicial review of the discretionary acts of other branches of
government.” In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629.
This Court has adopted the criterion set out in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), to determine whether
judicial resolution of an issue would require a judicial determination
of how another branch of government should exercise its discretion.
See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639–40, 778 P.2d
757, 761–62 (1989) (applying Baker to separation of powers issue
arising under Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution). Baker
directs that the courts examine: (1) whether the constitution directs
that the issue be resolved by a coordinate branch of government;
(2) whether judicially manageable standards exist for the resolution
of the issue; (3) whether it is possible to render a decision without
making an initial nonjudicial policy determination; (4) whether
judicial resolution would evince a lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; (5) whether there is an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
(6) whether judicial resolution would embarrassingly result in varied
rules among separate departments of government on a single
question. 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.
Id. Application of these standards to the facts of this case shows that the jury
had jurisdiction to decide if the money designated to pay for a backup cell phone
for the sheriff but which was instead used to pay for a cell phone for the sheriff’s
wife was knowingly used for a “personal purpose.”
The legislature passed I.C. § 18-5701 as part of the criminal code. Thus,
the Idaho Constitution does not direct that a defendant’s guilt under this section
“be resolved by a coordinate branch of government.”

To the contrary, the

constitution specifically requires juries to make such a determination.

Idaho

Const., Art. I, § 7. Olsen’s argument fails on the first prong of the test.
Even though the first prong of the test seems determinative, Olsen fairs no
better on the other prongs. The legislature created I.C. § 18-5701 with the clear
intent that it be treated as a criminal statute. Handling charges of violating this
6

statute in the criminal justice system as intended by the legislature means that
“judicially manageable standards exist for the resolution of the issue” and “it is
possible to render a decision without making an initial nonjudicial policy
determination,” while a jury resolution would not “evince a lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government,” require “an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made,” or “embarrassingly result in
varied rules among separate departments of government on a single question.”
In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629. The law
supports the district court’s determination that a criminal case was the proper
forum for deciding Olsen’s guilt of a charge brought under I.C. § 18-5701.
Olsen asserts the district court erred, but fails to acknowledge that the
district court rejected the factual underpinnings of his claim. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 10-23.) Thus, his brief is full of factual assertions rejected by the district
court, without any claim that the district court’s factual findings are erroneous.
The relevant facts were found by the district court. As set forth above, the county
authorized payment for a backup cell phone for the sheriff, but the sheriff (Olsen)
gave the county-paid phone to his wife for her personal use without the
commissioner’s knowledge or approval. (6/19/15 Tr., p. 120, L. 6 – p. 121, L. 9;
p. 122, Ls 12-20; p. 132, Ls. 14-19.) The question of whether by doing so Olsen
violated I.C. § 18-5701 was for the jury.
Olsen’s legal arguments are also meritless.

That the county

commissioners made a post-facto investigation and held a vote on the
appropriateness of Olsen’s actions is irrelevant.
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Olsen’s argument that the

county commissioners had the power to make the determination of whether he
used money for personal purposes is rendered specious by merely asking what
would have happened had the commissioners decided he had used the money
for personal purposes. Clearly Olsen would not have then submitted himself for
sentencing.
By providing in a criminal statute that a person violates the law by
knowingly using public money for a personal use, the legislature created a
question clearly and directly within the jurisdiction of the criminal courts to
generally be resolved by juries. Olsen has failed to show that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to try the criminal charges brought in this case.
II.
Olsen Has Failed To Show That The Misuse Of Public Money Statute Is
Unconstitutionally Vague Either On Its Face Or As Applied
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that I.C. § 18-5701(10) was not impermissibly

vague, either on its face or as applied to Olsen. (6/19/15 Tr., p. 126, L. 10 – p.
138, L. 10.)

Olsen argues the statute is vague on its face and as applied

because it does not clearly define when a person may be guilty for incidental
personal use of a good or service provided by public money. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 23-27.) This argument fails under the law and the facts of this case because
the statute provided notice that paying for cell phone service for Olsen’s wife’s
personal and non-governmental business was misuse of public moneys.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The construction and application of a statute are questions of law over

which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Locke, 149 Idaho 641,
642, 239 P.3d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505,
80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003)); State v. Scott, 135 Idaho 457, 458-59, 19
P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Pusey, 128 Idaho 647, 648, 917 P.2d
804, 805 (Ct. App. 1996). The constitutionality of a statute is likewise a question
of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Doe I v. Doe, 138
Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 1040, 1050 (2003).
C.

The Statute Provided Notice Generally And To Olsen Specifically That
Providing A County-Paid Cell Phone To A Family Member Exclusively For
Personal Business Was Illegal
“A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute

or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’” F.C.C. v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quoting
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).

Thus, “the void-for-

vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary
and discriminatory prosecutions.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412
(2010).

Statutes, however, have “strong presumptive validity” and the court

must, if it can, “construe, not condemn” them. Id. at 403 (internal quotes and
cites omitted). That “close cases can be envisioned” is insufficient to “render[] a
statute vague” because the state must still prove its case beyond a reasonable
9

doubt. Williams, 553 U.S. at 305-06. Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries”
are “imprecise,” such uncertainty has “little relevance” if the “appellant’s conduct
falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s proscriptions.” Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 411-12 (citing
Broadrick). Furthermore, sufficient clarity “may be supplied by judicial gloss on
an otherwise uncertain statute.”

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266

(1997). “‘One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully
challenge it for vagueness.’” Alcohol Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944,
949, 231 P.3d 1041, 1046 (2010) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n. 7 (1982) (internal quote omitted)).
The statute in question provides that a public officer or employee may not
“[k]nowingly use any public moneys … to make any purchase … for any personal
purpose or for any purpose other than for the use or benefit of the governmental
entity.” I.C. § 18-5701(10). Olsen was knowingly using public money to pay for
the service for his wife’s private cell phone.

This statute clearly applies to

Olsen’s conduct, so he may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.
Olsen claims that the statute is vague because cars, computers and
phones provided to governmental employees can be subjected to incidental
personal use. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-26.) Most of the examples he provides,
however, are clearly outside of the scope of the statute because application of
the plain language of the statute to those examples shows no violation.
The statute prohibits knowingly using “public moneys … for any personal
purpose.” I.C. § 18-5701(10). Thus, when a government agency provides its
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employees with cars and gasoline, cell phone service, and internet service so
that those employees may do their jobs or do them better, the public money
being spent on those things is not being used for a “personal purpose.” This is
true regardless of whether employees also “make personal calls,” “utilize[e] the
internet during breaks for personal purposes,” or drive their government cars
home “at night.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) Providing a per diem allowance to
cover travel expenses when a governmental employee has to travel for work
(Appellant’s brief, p. 26) is also not spending money for a “personal purpose.”
Likewise, paying for a hotel room for a governmental employee on official
business is not rendered into public money spent for a “personal purpose” if the
employee’s spouse also stays in the room. (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.) Olsen’s
argument that the statute is vague because it “could be argued” that these
situations violate the statute (Appellant’s brief, p. 25) is unpersuasive because
the hypotheticals Olsen posits are clearly outside the reach of the statute.
Moreover, even if he could actually state a hypothetical where application
would be vague, such would show no more than that the statute’s “outermost
boundaries” are “imprecise,” which uncertainty has “little relevance” because
Olsen’s “conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s
proscriptions.”

Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608.

Olsen has failed to posit any

hypotheticals allegedly showing a lack of notice where a government employee
turns over his government-issued car, computer or phone to a relative with no
governmental responsibilities, for that relative’s private use.

11

Olsen’s argument that because a governmental employee may use his
government-paid cell phone plan to also make personal calls renders ambiguous
whether I.C. § 18-5701(10) prohibited him from using public money to pay for his
wife’s personal cell phone service is without merit. He has failed to show error in
the district court’s ruling.
III.
Olsen Has Failed To Demonstrate That Convicting And Sentencing Him For
Three Crimes Exceeded The Legislative Intent For Punishment
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that three counts of misuse of public moneys

did not violate double jeopardy because each count related to different annual
budgets. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 50, L. 18 – p. 52, L. 8.) Olsen’s argument that he could
only be convicted and sentenced for a single count is without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant’s prosecution complies with the constitutional

protection against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review.
State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).
C.

The Legislature Authorized A Sentence Of Up To Five Years For Each
“Separate Incident” Of Olsen’s Misuse Of Public Money And A Sentence
Of Up To 14 Years For Each “Common Scheme Or Plan” Resulting In The
Misuse Of More Than $300 Of Public Moneys
The United States Constitution prevents repeated jeopardy “for the same

offense.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The main protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause is “to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and

12

possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). It also, however,
“protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”

Missouri v.

Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983). See also Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376,
381 (1989) (“in the multiple punishments context” the interest protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause is “limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not
exceed that authorized by the legislature”) (internal quotations omitted)).

To

determine legislative intent:
“The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not.”
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981) (quoting Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
The statute relevant to what punishment the legislature intended is I.C. §
18-5702, titled: “Grading and punishment for misuse of funds.”

A person

convicted of misuse of public moneys is guilty of: (1) a misdemeanor if he is a
“public employee who is not charged with the receipt, safekeeping or
disbursement of public moneys” and misuses less than $300 of public moneys,
I.C. § 18-5702(1); (2) a felony punishable by up to five years if he is a “public
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officer or public employee charged with the receipt, safekeeping or disbursement
of public moneys” and “the amount of public moneys misused is less than three
hundred dollars ($300),” I.C. § 18-5702(2); and (3) a felony punishable by up to
14 years if the amount of misused money exceeds $300, I.C. § 18-5702(3). The
statute also provides:
When any series of violations of section 18-5701, Idaho Code,
comprised of separate incidents of misuse of public moneys in
amounts less than three hundred dollars ($300) are part of a
common scheme or plan, the incidents may be aggregated in one
(1) count and the sum of the value of all the incidents shall be the
value considered in determining whether the amount exceeds three
hundred dollars ($300).
I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a).
By this plain language, the legislature has provided that the prosecution
may charge either “separate incidents” of misuse of public moneys or may
aggregate incidents that are part of a “common scheme or plan.” Where, as
here, the defendant is a “public officer or public employee charged with the
receipt, safekeeping or disbursement of public moneys,” “separate incidents” of
misuse of less than $300 of public moneys constitutes a five-year felony. Also
where, as here, the “separate incidents” are individually less than $300, they may
be aggregated if part of a common scheme or plan, which would constitute a 14year felony.
Olsen was charged in Counts I, II and III as “a public officer … charged
with the receipt, safekeeping or disbursement of public moneys.” (R., pp. 10-11.)
In Counts I and II he was charged with having misused public moneys of “at least
$300,” while in Count III he was charged with misusing “less than $300.” (Id.)
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Thus, Counts I, II and III charged the five-year felony under subsection (2)
(because he was a public officer charged with receipt, safekeeping or
disbursement) and Counts I and II also charged the 14-year felony under
subsection (3) (because he was charged with misusing $300 or more).

The

evidence showed that “Defendant approved the expenditure of public funds for
his wife’s personal cell phone in a separate instance every month from January
2010 until April 2012.” (R., p. 98.2)
The district court stated it had “looked at the statute carefully” and “looked
at the evidence that was presented to the grand jury” and concluded “there is a
basis for the Court to conclude that a reasonable jury could conclude that there
were separate and distinct acts here in this case” and that “the statute gives the
prosecutor very clearly a substantial amount of discretion” in deciding to
aggregate incidents into a single count. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 50, L. 25 – p. 51, L. 13.)
The district court held that charging one count for each misuse would have been
inappropriate. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 14-28 (“28 different counts” would have
been “prosecutorial piling on”).) Because the 28 monthly payments were made
pursuant to an annual budgeting cycle, dividing the 28 counts by calendar year
was appropriate. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 51, L. 21 – p. 52, L. 8.) Although not made
explicit by the district court, its rejection of the monthly payments as the proper

This factual assertion was in the state’s memorandum in opposition to the
motion to dismiss and was based on the grand jury transcript, which was the
primary evidence before the district court at that time. (R., p. 98.) Olsen has not
included in the record the grand jury transcript or the portions of the trial
transcript relevant to this issue, but this fact seems uncontested for purposes of
this appeal.
2
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measure of the crime implies that the court was finding that each year was a
“separate incident” of misuse of public funds because budgeting would have
been annual.3
On appeal Olsen claims that the “first error” committed by the district court
was by reviewing the facts and evidence instead of deciding the question as one
of law.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 30.) While the state agrees that application of

double jeopardy standards is a matter of law subject to free review by this Court,
Santana, supra, double jeopardy law may not be applied in a vacuum.

The

legislature clearly provided that prosecution by “separate incidents” is
acceptable, but that the prosecutor “may” aggregate incidents committed
pursuant to a common scheme or plan. Thus, consideration of the facts and
circumstances underlying the charges is necessary.
Olsen next claims the district court erred by failing to consider “the intent
and the objective of the actor.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-31.)

First, Olsen

misstates the test, perhaps because it refutes his first argument. The actual test
for determining whether “a course of criminal conduct constitutes one offense or
several” is “whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct and
independent crimes.” State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 660, 330 P.3d 400, 406 (Ct.
App. 2014) (internal quotes omitted). Part of this test is “an inquiry into the
circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the intent and objective of the

This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Count III, although it covered four
months of payments, cannot be considered an aggregated count because it
alleged misuse of an amount less than $300. (R., p. 11.) It thus appears that the
district court concluded that each count was properly pled as a “separate
incident[] of misuse of public moneys.” I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a).
3
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actor.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). Olsen’s encouragement to consider only his
intent is misleading because that is not the test.
While considering “the circumstances of the conduct” and “the intent and
objective of the actor” is appropriate, it must be done in the context of clearly
stated legislative intent, and certainly cannot override that intent.

See, e.g.,

Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367-68 (double jeopardy tests for gleaning legislative intent,
such as Blockburger, do not apply when there is a clear indication of legislative
intent). Here the only question of “intent and objective of the actor” is whether
Olsen’s acts of misusing public funds were “part of a common scheme or plan,”
and even then the question of common scheme of plan is relevant only to
whether the prosecutor “may” aggregate the incidents. I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a). The
proper test here is the plain language of I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a), which allows the
charging of “separate incidents” or the aggregation by the prosecutor of
“separate incidents” if part of a “common scheme or plan.”
Olsen next argues that the “evidence in the record demonstrates that” his
“intent and objective” was “not to commit separate crimes” and his conduct “was
part of one continuous transaction.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 32.) This argument
fails for two reasons: first, the legislative intent, not Olsen’s intent, controls, and
the legislature’s intent, as expressed in I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a), allows prosecution
for either “separate incidents” or the aggregation of incidents by the prosecutor if
“part of a common scheme or plan.”

Thus, the legislature designated the

prosecutor as the entity to make the decision to aggregate (“incidents may be
aggregated”), not the defendant. That Olsen, on appeal, is willing to now admit
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that his misuse of public funds was pursuant to a single common scheme or plan
does not require consolidation of convictions or sentences.
The second reason Olsen’s argument based on the “evidence in the
record” fails is that most of the evidence is not in the record.
On appeal the appellant must carry the burden of showing that the
district court committed error. Error will not be presumed on appeal
but must be affirmatively shown on the record by appellant. Where
an incomplete record is presented to this Court, the missing
portions of that record are to be presumed to support the action of
the trial court.
Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980). Olsen did
not request a full trial transcript, but instead requested only that the trial
testimony of some of the witnesses be transcribed. (R., p. 598.) Any claim by
Olsen of what the record shows must be rejected because he has not provided
most of the relevant record.
Olsen also argues that the statute grants the prosecutor authority to
aggregate into one count, not “to combine the separate incidents into three
counts.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 33.) To the extent he argues that the statute
provides for prosecution for “separate incidents” or aggregation of incidents by
“common scheme or plan,” Olsen is entirely correct. The flaw in his argument is
the assumption that there was only one charge that could be made in this case.
As set forth above, legislative intent as expressed in the plain language of
I.C. § 18-5702(4)(a), is that misuse of public funds be prosecuted either as
“separate incidents” of misuse of public moneys or that such incidents if “in
amounts less than three hundred dollars ($300),” “may” be aggregated into “one
(1) count” if “part of a common scheme or plan.” Thus, the units of prosecution
18

are (1) any misuse of public funds over $300 (which may not be aggregated); (2)
any “separate incident” of misuse of public funds under $300 (either because not
part of a common scheme or plan or because separate incidents were not
aggregated at the discretion of the prosecutor); or (3) an aggregation, by the
prosecutor, of separate incidents of misuse of under $300 of public moneys that
were part of a common scheme or plan. The three counts in this case were
consistent with legislative intent, as found by the district court, because they were
“separate incidents.”
Olsen attacks the district court’s conclusion that each year of payments for
his wife’s private cell phone with public moneys constituted a separate act of
misuse of public moneys by arguing that “even if there were separate budgets for
each year that does not satisfy [the Blockburger test]” because there is no
additional fact required to prove each charge. (Appellant’s brief, p. 32. 4) This
argument is badly flawed, because the state had to prove each separate act of
misuse of public moneys. Clearly misuse of public moneys in 2010 was a fact
that needed to be proved only in relation to Count I, misuse of public moneys in
2011 was a fact that needed to be proved only in relation to Count II, and misuse
of public moneys in 2012 was a fact that needed to be proved only in relation to
Count III. Olsen’s argument that a defendant who commits three crimes by three
criminal acts can only be sentenced for a single crime if the three counts are

Olsen also claims there is no evidence of separate budgets or cell phone
contracts in the record. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 31-32.) As noted above, Olsen
has not provided a complete record, and so may not prevail on that claim
because the missing parts of the record are presumed to support the district
court’s decision.
4
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charged under the same statute is, based on the double jeopardy standard
stated above, simply wrong.
The evidence in this case shows that Olsen used public money to pay for
his wife’s private cell phone. He made 28 monthly payments of less than $300
each. The statute provides that such a course of action may be charged either
as “separate incidents” or by aggregating into one count “separate incidents” less
than $300 that are “part of a common scheme or plan.” One way to view the
proper charging in this case would be to count all 28 monthly payments as
“separate incidents” and charge each as a single five-year felony, or to aggregate
them all as a single count of one common scheme or plan.5
Olsen argues the district court was “correct” in its rejection of 28 counts
being the appropriate way to charge this case. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 33-34.)
That, however, begs the question of what constitutes a proper charge of
“separate incidents” under the statute.

The district court concluded that one

year’s worth of payments was a proper charge of a “separate incident” because
budgets and contracts are often annual. Olsen contends this was error without
offering an alternative “separate incident” breakdown of charges. He is thus
making the incongruous argument that one count is both the “separate incident”

The state notes that there is no “common scheme or plan” alleged in the
indictment. (R., pp. 10-11.) The jury did find that Olsen misused more than $300
in relation to Counts I and II (R., pp. 491-92), but it does not appear from the
record that this represents an aggregation under a common scheme or plan. If
this Court concludes that the proper charge for each separate incident is each
monthly payment, then the state concedes Olsen is convicted of three five-year
felonies and not one five-year felony and two 14-year felonies. If, however, each
year is a proper non-aggregated charge, Olsen is convicted of two 14-year
felonies and one five-year felony.
5
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charging and the aggregation charging. Because Olsen has failed to show, as a
matter of law, that annual charging was an improper measure of each “separate
incident” of misuse of public moneys, he has failed to show error.6
Finally, if the district court was in error in concluding the annual charging
was a proper “separate incident” charge, then the only conceivable “separate
incident” charge was each monthly payment.

Thus, the inevitable result of

finding error in the district court’s ruling would be that Olsen could properly have
been convicted of and sentenced for either 28 counts or one aggregated count.
Thus, because the legislature provided for up to 28 five-year sentences under the
facts of this case, any error by the district court in allowing three convictions and
potential sentences was necessarily harmless.

I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect,

irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.”); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814 (2014)
(“To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”).
Olsen has failed to show error. If this Court concludes that some sort of
annual basis for calculating each incident of misuse of public moneys was error,
then the error was harmless because Olsen was convicted of fewer counts than
he could have been convicted of.

The state notes that Olsen did not move to have his charges amended to reflect
fiscal or cell phone service contract years.
6
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s
withheld judgment.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2016.
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